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Abstract
Vaccine-preventable diseases (VPDs) are costly at both the individual and societal levels. The most common VPDs recorded in travellers
are enteric (typhoid or paratyphoid B) fever, acute viral hepatitis, influenza, varicella, measles, pertussis and bacterial meningitis. Travel-
lers suffering from VPDs are frequently hospitalized, illustrating the point that VPDs are serious and expensive. Many travellers are not
properly immunized before travel. In addition to individual consequences, VPDs can have public-health consequences if they are intro-
duced or re-introduced by infected travellers returning to areas with susceptible populations. The international spread of poliomyelitis,
Neisseria meningitidis serogroup W135 meningococcal infections, measles and influenza provides strong evidence of the role of interna-
tional travel in the globalization of VPDs. The surveillance of the emergence, re-emergence or spread of VPDs is essential to adapt pre-
travel advice and the responses to the VPD.
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Introduction
According to the World Tourism Organization, 25 people
cross a national border per second worldwide, and there
were 940 million international arrivals in 2010. International
tourist arrivals grew by almost 5% during the first months
of 2011, and there was a 7% increase in 2010 [1]. About
80 million persons from industrialized nations travel to the
developing world each year, and >200 million persons now
reside outside their country of birth. Travellers face expo-
sure to many infections, including many that are preventable
with vaccines. Vaccine-preventable diseases (VPDs) are
costly at both the individual and societal levels. The largest
study of VPDs in travellers was conducted by the GeoSenti-
nel surveillance network, over a 10-year period and
included 37 552 ill travellers, 508 of whom were found to
have contracted a VPD [2]. The most common VPDs
recorded were enteric (typhoid or paratyphoid B) fever,
acute viral hepatitis, influenza, varicella, measles, pertussis
and bacterial meningitis. No cases of yellow fever or Japa-
nese encephalitis were recorded. Three of the ill travellers
died: one each from enteric fever caused by Salmonella ent-
erica Serovar Typhi, pneumococcal meningitis and rabies.
More than half of these travellers with VPDs were hospital-
ized, illustrating the point that VPDs are serious and expen-
sive. Nearly 30% of those acquiring VPDs had had a
pretravel medical consultation. More recently, a study of
interest was conducted by the EuroTravNet/GeoSentinel
group in 2008. This study identified 166 cases of VPD
among 6957 ill European travellers, including cases of acute
hepatitis A and B, measles, Haemophilus influenzae B and
pneumococcal meningitis, pertussis, tick-borne encephalitis,
typhoid fever, varicella, diphtheria and influenza A and B
[3]. One limitation of these analyses is the lack of available
vaccination history, which makes it impossible to determine
the number of vaccine failures versus the number of VPDs
among those unvaccinated.
In addition to individual consequences, VPDs can have
public-health consequences if they are introduced or re-
introduced by ill travellers returning to areas with suscepti-
ble populations, as exemplified below for poliomyelitis,
meningococcal diseases, measles and influenza.
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The spread of poliomyelitis via
international travellers
Poliomyelitis is close to eradication. The efforts of the Glo-
bal Polio Eradication Initiative have brought down the num-
ber of polio cases worldwide from 350 000 cases in more
than 125 countries in 1988 to 2000 cases in nine countries
in 2002. Only four countries (Afghanistan, India, Nigeria and
Pakistan) have never completely interrupted the transmission
of wild poliovirus [4]. However, a major obstacle to polio
eradication appears to be international spread via travellers,
be it refugees, pilgrims, traders or tourists. Between 2003
and 2006, polio was imported by travellers into 24 polio-free
countries. The origin of these importations was largely the
four countries where polio transmission was never com-
pletely interrupted. The importations resulted in approxi-
mately 1400 secondary cases of the disease [4]. The number
of wild poliovirus cases worldwide increased from 1315
cases reported in 2007 to 1655 in 2008 and 1604 in 2009
and decreased to 1291 in 2010 [5,6]. In 2010, countries with
re-established transmission included Angola (viral strain
genetically linked to India), Chad and the Democratic Repub-
lic of the Congo [7,8]. An outbreak was reported in Tajiki-
stan following importation from India, with subsequent
spread to Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and the Russian Federa-
tion [9]. Outbreaks were also reported in several countries
in West and Central Africa and in Uganda and Nepal. Coun-
tries with confirmed wild poliovirus cases from 2008 through
to 2011 are listed in Table 1 [5]. Recently, poliomyelitis due
to wild poliovirus was imported from Pakistan to a devel-
oped country, Australia, by an adult traveller who had visited
friends and relatives in Pakistan. The individual had received
an oral polio vaccine during childhood but had not received
a booster dose before travel [10]. The lack of a recent vacci-
nation resulted in isolation of the patient in hospital for
34 days. Household contacts were quarantined at home for
16 days. Potential contacts including airline passengers,
healthcare workers and toilet contacts, totalling 468 individu-
als, were offered booster doses of inactivated poliovirus vac-
cine [11].
Expert groups are unanimous in recommending that the
immunization against poliomyelitis be updated in travellers
visiting a country where polio is endemic. Despite these rec-
ommendations, vaccination coverage against poliomyelitis
was demonstrated to be low in travellers from numerous
countries by studies conducted in France, Germany, Austral-
asia, the USA and South Africa [12]. To reduce the risk of
the international spread of polio by travellers, the Advisory
Committee on Immunization Practices in 2006 proposed an
additional strategy that would protect polio-free countries
from the re-introduction of wild poliovirus by requiring
proof of vaccination against polio from all travellers from
countries where polio is endemic travelling to polio-free
countries [4]. The rationale is similar to that for yellow
fever, for which proof of vaccination is required for travel-
lers as a condition of entry into certain countries. Saudi Ara-
bia now requires that all travellers/pilgrims aged <15 years
who are from polio-infected areas show proof of vaccination
with oral polio vaccine 6 weeks before application for the
entry visa [13]. Such a requirement is not endorsed by the
World Health Assembly but is allowable under the Interna-
tional Health Regulations [14,15]. Until the disease has been
certified as eradicated globally, the risks of acquiring polio
(for travellers to infected areas), and of re-infection of polio-
free areas (by travellers from infected areas) remain. Immuni-
zation programmes differ between European countries. We
recommend that a single booster dose should be given
before departure to individuals with complete primary series,
unless they received a booster <10 years ago (Table 2). Inac-
tivated poliovirus vaccine produces immunity to all three
types of poliovirus in over 90% of people following two
doses of vaccine given at least 4–8 weeks apart, and in close
to 100% following a booster given 6–12 months later [16].
Updates on countries with ongoing transmission of indige-
nous and imported wild poliovirus and countries with recent
transmission of imported wild poliovirus can be found at
http://www.polioeradication.org/casecount.asp.
The Hajj and Neisseria meningitidis
serogroup W135
The Hajj is a unique annual mass gathering that is required of
all able Muslims as a central tenet of their faith. As a result of
this mandate, each year over 2 million pilgrims from more
than 160 countries congregate in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. Given
the overcrowded conditions that characterize the pilgrimage,
infections that are transmitted via respiratory secretions are
TABLE 1. Countries with confirmed wild poliovirus cases
(January 2008 to March 2011)
Africa Angola, Benina, Burkina Fasoa, Central African Republica, Chad,
Coˆte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypta, Ethiopiaa,
Gabon, Ghanaa, Kenyaa, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria,
Republic of the Congo, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudana, Togoa,
Uganda
Asia Afghanistan, India, Kazakhstan, Nepal, Pakistan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan
Europe Russian Federation
aNo case reported since January 2010.
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a leading cause of morbidity in pilgrims [17]. The spread of
Neisseria meningitidis serogroup W135 following an outbreak
of this pathogen associated with the Hajj in 2000 and 2001 is
a classic example. The subsequent global spread of N. meningit-
idis W135 affected various countries (see Fig. 1); there were
outbreaks in nine countries in Europe and in Burkina Faso,
Niger and Singapore as well as isolated cases in Turkey, Cam-
eroon, Mauritius and the USA [18–26]. More than 400 labo-
ratory-confirmed cases of meningococcal disease caused by
N. meningitidis serogroup W135 were identified worldwide.
This strain became an important public health issue for the
first time, especially for countries whose citizens participated
in the Hajj. In many instances, pilgrims continued to have evi-
dence of nasopharyngeal carriage, with substantial transmis-
sion from vaccinated Hajj returnees to their unvaccinated
household contacts, because the polysaccharide vaccine used
at that time was not efficient in preventing nasopharyngeal
carriage [27,28]. Control measures included the institution of
a vaccination requirement for N. meningitidis W135 for the
Hajj in 2001 [29]. Since the introduction of the quadrivalent
meningococcal (A, C, Y, W135) vaccine as a Hajj visa require-
ment in 2002, no further outbreaks have occurred. The most
likely explanation for the emergence of W135 is the change
in selection pressure associated with the widespread use of
serogroup A and C polysaccharide vaccines [30]. Neisseria
meningitidis serogroup W135 was identified first in 1968 [31]
TABLE 2. Poliomyelitis and measles vaccination schedules used in Germany, France and the UK and proposed
recommendation for travellers to areas where poliomyelitis or measles cases are occurring
Primary immunization First booster Second booster
Third
booster
Fourth
booster Adult
Recommendation
for travellers
Poliomyelitis
Germanya Three doses at 2, 3
and 4 months of age
1 year after completion
of the primary course
Between 9 and
17 years of age
_ _ Not routinely
recommended
Individuals unvaccinated,
incompletely vaccinated,
or whose vaccination
status is unknown should
receive two doses of
vaccine at intervals of
4–8 weeks; a third dose
should be administered
6–12 months after the
second. Individuals with
complete primary series
should receive only one
other dose of vaccine
before departure unless
they received a booster
dose <10 years ago
Franceb Three doses at 2, 3
and 4 months of age
1 year after completion o
f the primary course
5 years after the f
irst booster
5 years after
the second
booster
5 years after
the third
booster
Every 10 years
United
Kingdomc
Three doses at 2, 3
and 4 months of age
3 years after completion
of the primary course
10 years after
the first booster
_ _ Not routinely
recommended
Measles
Germanya Two doses at 11–14
months and 15–23
months of age
– – – – Individuals born
since 1970 should
have received a
total of two doses
Individuals over 6 months
of agee unvaccinated, or
whose vaccination status
is unknown should receive
one (6–11 months of age)
or two doses of vaccine at
intervals of 1 month when
possible (12 years of age
and overf) or there should
be evidence of
seroconversion
to the relevant antigen.
Individuals who have
already received one dose
of vaccine should receive
a second dose to ensure
that they are protected
Franceb Two doses at 12
months and
13–24 months of age
– – – – Individuals born
since 1980 should
have received a
total of two doses
United
Kingdomd
Two doses at 13
months of age and
before school entry
– – – – Individuals born
since 1970 should
have received a
total of two doses
ahttp://www.rki.de/cln_151/nn_195844/DE/Content/Infekt/EpidBull/Archiv/2011/30__11,templateId=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf/30_11.pdf.
bhttp://www.invs.sante.fr/beh/2011/10_11/beh_10_11_2011.pdf.
chttp://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@en/documents/digitalasset/dh_108823.pdf.
dhttp://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@en/documents/digitalasset/dh_122643.pdf.
eBecause the serological response to the measles component of the vaccine varies among infants aged 6–11 months, infants vaccinated before age 12 months should be revac-
cinated on or after the first birthday with one dose of vaccine followed by a second dose at least 28 days later.
fDepending on the countries of origin, individuals born before 1980 (France) or 1970 (Germany and UK) are likely to have natural immunity against measles and systematic
vaccination is not recommended. When possible, a serological control may be of interest as evidence of seroconversion to the relevant antigen.
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and has not played a major role in outbreaks despite its circu-
lation since the 1970s [32]. After 2003, no major outbreak
caused by serogroup W135 has been detected in sub-Saharan
countries, though sporadic cases have been reported. How-
ever, a recent meningitis outbreak occurred in Niger in 2010,
with W135 accounting for 49% of laboratory-confirmed
N. meningitidis cases [33]. The risk of meningococcal infec-
tions and outbreaks worldwide can be reduced if appropriate
education and prophylactic measures are implemented before
travel. Identifying and preparing travellers at increased risk
for the acquisition of meningococcal disease is the most effec-
tive strategy to prevent disease among travellers and their
relatives, especially with the availability of highly immunogenic
novel conjugate vaccines, which result in reduced carriage
and long-term immunity [34]. We recommend that the conju-
gate vaccine should be used in travellers to areas in Africa
where polio is endemic and to Hajj pilgrims, rather than the
polysaccharide vaccine. The vaccine efficacy is 87–98% and
85–100% for conjugate and polysaccharide vaccines, respec-
tively [16].
Measles and the role of travellers in its re-
emergence
Although there has been a global decrease in the incidence
of measles around the world, eradication of the disease has
not been achieved, and measles outbreaks continue to occur
as a result of suboptimal vaccination coverage, as in Europe
[35], and of the importation of cases by travellers into coun-
tries where the disease has been declared eliminated, such
as the USA [36]. Residents who have travelled in areas
where measles is endemic or foreign tourists from these
areas can import measles (see Fig. 2 for areas in which peo-
ple are at risk of acquiring measles). The risk of secondary
transmission is high because measles is one of the most con-
tagious human diseases. It has been estimated that one case
of measles will result in 7–15 secondary cases [37]. In 2001
and 2003, two outbreaks of measles occurred in Australia,
[38,39], with the index distinct case being a young adult trav-
eller returning from India. In the USA, from 2001 to 2008
(after the elimination era), 493 of the 557 confirmed cases
of measles were import-associated cases [36]. Most of the
imported cases occurred after travel in the Western Pacific
Region or, from 2005 to 2008, after travel in the WHO
European region [36]. Twelve outbreaks occurred during this
period [36]. In 1999, an outbreak was related to a minister
returning from Europe and Africa [40]. Outbreaks have also
been reported during international sporting events in the
USA [41]. In Europe, the spread of the measles virus D4-
Hamburg, the virus that has been circulating since 2008, was
traced and was found to be linked to ‘travel’ by persons of
the Roma ethnic group [42]. Measles outbreaks in Ireland
[43], Germany [44], and many European countries [35]
occurred also after the importation of the disease by inter-
national travellers. The analysis of the genotype of the virus
can help to determine the source of the outbreak
[36,39,42,45,46].
FIG. 1 Hajj-related outbreaks of W135 meningococcal infections worldwide (red stars) following the outbreak in Saudi Arabia in 2001–2002
(black star).
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The transmission of measles can also occur after exposure
during air travel [45,47,48]. Transmission has been reported
to persons seated farther away from the index case than the
usual two rows that are considered at risk [48]. Moreover,
young adults are often involved in imported measles out-
breaks [36,38,39], and seven cases of measles among young
children aged 6–23 months returning to the USA after travel
have been reported [49]; four of these individuals required
hospitalization. To prevent the spread of measles and avoid
the complications of the disease, it is necessary to improve
the vaccination coverage against measles in people living in
countries where cases still occur. International travellers
from countries where measles is not endemic must also
update their vaccinations against measles with a measles–
mumps–rubella vaccine or a measles-containing vaccine.
Immunization programmes differ between European coun-
tries (Table 2). For international travel, we recommend that
children aged 6–11 months, who are at greater risk of
severe measles, receive one dose of the measles-containing
vaccine or the measles–mumps–rubella vaccine, and individu-
als aged ‡12 months receive two doses of the measles-con-
taining vaccine or the measles–mumps–rubella vaccine before
travelling when possible [47,49]. The vaccine efficacy is 95–
100% [16]. Travellers and clinicians should keep in mind that
a self-reported history of measles is not adequate evidence
of immunity, and only the documented receipt of two doses
of a measles-containing vaccine or laboratory evidence of
immunity should be accepted [50]. Moreover, the diagnosis
of measles should be systematically investigated in febrile
returning travellers. In addition, the vaccine status against
measles should be determined, and patients should be iso-
lated until the diagnosis of measles has been eliminated.
Influenza and pandemic H1N1 2009
influenza: the spread of viruses and
international travellers
Influenza represented 12% of the 580 cases of VPD diag-
nosed in the ill returning travellers included in the GeoSenti-
nel database from 1997 to 2007 [2]. Influenza is considered
the most frequent vaccine-preventable infection with poten-
tial morbidity in travellers to tropical or subtropical coun-
tries [51,52]. The transmission of influenza during
transportation has been reported in airplanes [53] and, more
often, in cruise ships [53–57].
Outbreaks of influenza have been reported on summer
cruise ships in both the southern and northern hemispheres
[53–57]. On these cruise ships, both influenza A and B
viruses were found, and cases have been reported outside
the domestic epidemic season, making diagnosis more diffi-
cult. Moreover, the lack of available influenza vaccines during
the summer months in the northern hemisphere constitutes
a difficulty for managing summer influenza outbreaks. A large
Number of Reported Measles Cases with onset date from 
Mar 2011 to Sep 2011
Data source: surveillance DEF file
Data in HQ as of 12 October 2011
The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply the 
expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the World Health Organization 
concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or 
concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.  Dotted lines on maps represent 
approximate border lines for which there may not yet be full agreement. 
©WHO 2011. All rights reserved.
0 (63 countries or 33%)
1 - 9 (28 countries or 15%)
10 - 99 (40 countries or 21%)
100 - 999 (28 countries or 15%)
≥1000 (21 countries or 11%)
No data reported to WHO HQ
(13 countries or 7%)
FIG. 2 Number of reported measles cases with an onset date between February 2011 and August 2011. Data from the WHO were obtained
from http://www.who.int/immunization_monitoring/diseases/measles_monthlydata/en/index.html.
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summertime influenza A outbreak was reported in Alaska
and the Yukon territory; this outbreak occurred in two con-
secutive years and predominantly affected tourists on the
cruise ships and tourism workers [54]. Cruise ships, shared
itineraries, hotels and buses used by different tour groups
probably facilitate influenza transmission and the spread of
other viruses, as does the fact that passengers are usually
from different countries and both hemispheres. The crew
may sometimes serve as a reservoir [55]. The roles of these
outbreaks and of the importation of viruses by travellers in
the global spread and in domestic epidemics of influenza have
been debated [54,55,58]. Finally, on cruise ships, passengers
are often elderly and have additional risk factors for the
respiratory complications of influenza that can lead to poten-
tial morbidity [55,57]. Consequently, possible personal and
public health consequences make preventing influenza in
cruise travellers by vaccination highly recommended.
Influenza vaccination has been demonstrated to be effec-
tive in reducing the risk of influenza in travellers such as Hajj
pilgrims [53,59]. However, despite this efficacy, only 41% of
US resident international travellers reported receiving the
influenza vaccine during the previous season of their travel,
although 75% knew that the vaccine is a good preventive
measure [60]. Every traveller, even those travelling for busi-
ness [2] or visiting friends and relatives [51], should be vacci-
nated against influenza before travel if not previously
vaccinated with the seasonal vaccine. When travellers do
switch hemispheres during travel, vaccination with the corre-
sponding vaccine would be beneficial [61] and is possible at
travel medicine centres in the USA and Australia [53]. In
Europe, the availability of the vaccine designated for the
other hemisphere is variable. For instance, in France, influ-
enza vaccines for the southern hemisphere are available only
by obtaining nominative temporary approval for each patient
[62]. Recently, the utility of adjuvanted seasonal influenza
vaccine for travellers has been questioned even though it is
probably most effective and produces cross-reactive antibod-
ies to heterovariant viruses [63].
The epidemic of influenza A/H1N1/2009 became a pan-
demic in <2 months—much faster than the pandemic of
1918—because of international travellers. Apart from the
cases in Mexico, all cases of influenza A/H1N1/2009 world-
wide were imported [64,65]. The transmission of pandemic
A/H1N1 has been reported during modern commercial air
travel [66]. Of course, no vaccine against the pandemic virus
was available at the beginning of the pandemic; therefore, only
preventive measures such as hand washing, avoiding crowded
areas, the use of a facial mask and antiviral drugs could be
proposed to travellers. Education of travellers about preven-
tive measures against influenza viruses should also be pro-
vided before international travel [60]. The recommendations
for influenza vaccination for travellers are summarized in
Table 3. The influenza vaccine efficacy is 70–90% in healthy
adults and children. In the elderly it is 56% effective at pre-
venting respiratory symptoms, 50% effective in preventing
hospitalization and 68% effective in preventing death [16]. We
recommend that travellers from the northern hemisphere vis-
iting the southern hemisphere, and particularly belonging to
the risk groups where the health authorities recommend
immunization during the winter season, should routinely be
recommended an influenza vaccination.
Conclusion
Because of increasing international tourism, the practice of tra-
vel medicine based on clear guidelines is of increasing impor-
tance. Many travellers are not properly immunized before
travel, and travellers have contributed to the spread of VPDs,
including in countries were these disease were thought to have
been eradicated or at least under control. A pre-travel consul-
tation is an opportunity to review a traveller’s vaccination his-
tory, including both routine scheduled vaccines and travel-
specific vaccines. The surveillance of the emergence, re-emer-
gence or spread of VPDs is essential to adapt pretravel advice
and responses to VPDs. For this purpose, public health institu-
tions and competent bodies of ministries of health are con-
nected with clinicians. However, in recent years, clinician-
based surveillance and networking have been demonstrated to
be essential to reinforce regular routine disease reporting
through fast reporting of sentinel patients [67–69].
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TABLE 3. Influenza vaccination recommendations for
travellers
Indications for influenza vaccination (latest available or from the opposite hemi-
sphere when available)
All travellers, regardless of age (>6 months)a
Particularly patients with co-morbidities (particularly cardiopulmonary and immuno-
logical) and pregnant womenb
All cruise ship passengers and personnelb
All travellers going to high-risk settings: mass gatherings, camps, group toursb
Occupational vaccination: airplane crew, tourism staff, medical staff, etc.b
aData from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (available at http://
www.cdc;gov/vaccines/recs/schedules/downloads/ adult/mmwr-adult-shedule.pdf).
bData from reference [62].
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